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The international community’s participation in the peace process since Oslo has been 
premised on the assumption that a two-state solution is a strategic objective of both 
Israel and the Palestinians.  
The prospect of Israel giving up the territory it has occupied since 1967 is perceived 
by the international community to be in Israel’s strategic interest because it promises 
peace with its neighbours and compliance with international law. More significantly, 
the alternative, whereby Israel absorbs the populations of the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip, is presumed to result in it becoming a state with a non-Jewish majority, an 
apparently unthinkable prospect for the Zionist project. 
For the Palestinians, the two-state solution based upon the pre-1967 war borders 
represents an important compromise because it would involve giving up the 
Palestinian territories occupied by Israel in 1948 and settling for 22 per cent of 
historical Palestine, together with a dilution of the right of return, whose details are 
yet to be negotiated.1 While this was a significant dilution of Palestinian aspirations, it 
was expected that the Palestinian leadership would accept such a compromise given 
the military realities on the ground and the fact that the land occupied in 1967 on 
which the future Palestinian state would ostensibly be created included East 
Jerusalem. These facts, together with the perception that the refugees have limited 
political power, led the international community to assume that the Palestinian 
leadership could hope to gain just enough internal support to achieve a viable and 
sovereign Palestinian state based on the 1967 borders. 
Thus, the international community had reason to believe that the two sides would 
converge on a two-state solution on 1967 borders, particularly given that anything less 
would almost certainly destroy the Palestinian coalition that was emerging for ending 
the conflict on this basis. It is therefore not surprising that long after the failure of 
Camp David, ex-president Clinton continued to argue (in 2004) that only a Palestinian 
state on the occupied territory with East Jerusalem as its capital can address the 
concerns of both sides. As he has put it, ‘in private, we all know, within two or three 
degrees of difference, what the final peace agreement is going to look like, if there’s 
ever going to be one.’2  
This apparently obvious endgame makes it very difficult to explain Israel’s approach 
to creating new facts on the ground. Far from withdrawing from the oPt after the 
                                                 
1 Karma Nabulsi, ‘The Peace Process and the Palestinians: A Road Map to Mars’, International Affairs, 
Vol. 80, No. 2 (2004), pp. 221–31. 
2 Bill Clinton discusses foreign policy and security threats in CNN Interview with Christiane 
Amanpour, 10 July 2004. Transcript available at 
www.cnn.com/2004/ALLPOLITICS/07/09/amanpour.clinton.transcript/. 
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signing of the Oslo Agreements, Israel has only fitfully withdrawn from heavily 
populated parts while accelerating the construction of settlements in other parts. At 
the same time, the ‘matrix of control’, in terms of roads, checkpoints and border 
controls, has been significantly tightened.3  
The inconsistency between the two-state assumptions and the facts on the ground 
cannot be explained away in terms of missed opportunities, unfortunate accidents or 
even the power of minority groups such as the settler lobby in Israel. In fact, the 
Israeli conditions for engaging with the Palestinians during the period of 
disengagement defined by the Oslo Accords reveal significant strategic concerns that 
were not compatible with an intended withdrawal to pre-1967 borders or even to 
borders close to the pre-1967 ones. Israel’s insistence on ‘security first’ was the most 
important of these conditions.  
A dissection of Israel’s security-first conditions reveals a number of possible 
underlying strategic concerns that may have justified Israel’s insistence on these 
conditions. But when we compare the facts on the ground with the behaviour that 
would be consistent with each of these concerns, we find that Israeli actions 
(regardless of the party in power) were most consistent with strategic concerns that 
were likely to be undermined by the creation of a viable and sovereign Palestinian 
state. The erroneous assumption that is often made is that there is a widely shared 
perception within Israel that a withdrawal to pre-1967 borders and the creation of a 
sovereign Palestinian state on the vacated territories is necessary and sufficient to 
preserve the constitutional features of a Jewish state within Israel’s pre-1967 borders. 
If this were the case, the subsequent actions of Israeli policy-makers after 1994, for 
instance to expand settlements, would be impossible to explain. We would have to fall 
back on explanations based on the irrational attachment of critical Israeli policy 
makers across the party divide to hold on to biblical lands that ultimately damage the 
prospects of a viable Jewish state. We reject the latter explanation, and instead we 
argue that the apparently contradictory actions of Israel can be rationally explained by 
the inherent internal contradictions of trying to maintain a Jewish state in the ethno-
demographic mix of contemporary Israel-Palestine.  
It is clear that there is a broad-based Israeli recognition of the need for Palestinian 
‘self-government ’ and even for some form of ‘state’, since it is clear that the total 
absorption of the Palestinian population of the occupied territories into Israel on equal 
terms would immediately undermine the Jewish character of the state of Israel. 
However, the error of the international community (and many Palestinians) was to 
jump from this observation to the conclusion that full sovereignty for the West Bank 
and Gaza would strengthen Israel’s position in maintaining the Jewish character of 
Israel. It is our contention that if we look carefully at the ethno-demographic 
distribution of populations and the implication of this for Israel’s attempt to ensure its 
Jewish nature, the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state on any set of borders 
simply does not address Israel’s strategic concerns. Wherever the borders of a future 
Palestinian state are drawn, a significant number of Palestinians will remain outside 
this state with Israeli citizenship and/or identity cards. Even if these Israeli 
Palestinians constitute as little as 20 percent or so of what remains of Israel’s 
                                                 
3 Jeff Halper, Obstacles to Peace: A Re-Framing of the Palestinian-Israeli Conflict  (Bethlehem: 
PalMap of GSE, 2004), pp. 12–20. 
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population, the operation of a Jewish constitution with inferior rights for this 
significant minority is not going to be easy. Secondly, the refugee issue cannot be 
settled simply by means of an agreement with the leadership of the Palestinian state. 
A programme of resettlement in the newly independent Palestinian state would be 
contested by many refugees and would in any case take years to complete. Both of 
these Palestinian groups have demands and aspirations that are not immediately 
addressed by the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state on pre-1967 borders, and yet 
their aspirations have to be managed if the Jewish constitution of Israel is to be 
protected. We describe this as the broader ethno-demographic challenge to Israel’s 
Jewish constitution.  
From this perspective, it becomes possible to explain how security measures that 
indefinitely delay the emergence of a sovereign Palestinian state can enhance Israel’s 
capacity to manage Palestinian aspirations in areas outside the West Bank and Gaza 
Strip, which is critical for the sustainability of the Jewish quasi-constitution of Israel. 
This ‘management’ strategy is not neat; it has many dangers, and is clearly 
unacceptable to all Palestinians. But it may be the best strategy that Israel has from 
the perspective of sustaining its primary goal. If we understand this, both security first 
and the associated facts on the ground become explicable as part of an Israeli strategy 
of long-term management of its ‘Palestinian problem’ through conditional, partial,  
and reversible transfers of governance responsibilities in densely populated parts of 
the occupied territory.  
If Israel’s best strategy does not involve the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state, 
such a state is not going to emerge through a process of negotiation given Israel’s 
military dominance. As a result, the conflict may be far more difficult to resolve than 
supporters of the two-state solution have assumed. Our analysis points not only to the 
futility of the external facilitation of a process that is not likely to lead to a truly 
sovereign Palestinian state (regardless of where the borders are drawn); it also points 
to the ultimately explosive nature of a conflict that has no obvious resolution.  We 
argue that the international discourse needs to move away from a discussion of 
security first conditions that cannot be met in a situation of permanent occupation and 
frequent Israeli military operations, to a discussion of what Israeli strategic objectives 
may really be, and how viable they are. In the context of Sharon’s unilateral 
disengagement plan, the international community needs to ask if anything significant 
has changed in Israel’s strategic calculations. To the extent that a significant change is 
very unlikely, the eventual outcome is likely to follow the pattern of previous Israeli 
withdrawals from Palestinian population centres. If the withdrawal does eventually 
happen, a period of possible calm is likely to be followed by increasing violations of 
security conditions and then by reversals and clampdowns by Israel, followed, if we 
are lucky, by the cycle beginning again. 
 
‘Security first’  
‘Security first’ refers to the set of security conditions on which Israel insists over the 
‘interim period’ prior to the establishment of a sovereign state. The uniqueness of 
these demands, and the insight they provide into Israel’s underlying motivations, has 
not been sufficiently understood. Although the international community now 
recognizes the impact of security containment on Palestinian poverty and well-being, 
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there is still no recognition of the likely endgames that are consistent with such an 
approach. 4 Israel’s insistence upon ‘security first’ reveals important issues that 
explain why it may not make strategic sense for Israel to offer full sovereignty to the 
West Bank and Gaza Strip. If so, the gulf between the diplomatic discourse and 
Israel’s actions on the ground becomes more explicable, but the prognosis of the 
prospects of real peace becomes very bleak. 
‘Security first’ describes the specific terms under which Israel has sought to withdraw 
sequentially from the occupied territory. These conditions should not be confused 
with the very reasonable demand that violence should be renounced during any 
negotiations. But this is not what ‘security first’ means in the Israel–Palestine context. 
Israel’s security-first requirement, as recognized in the Oslo agreements and all 
subsequent discussions of Israeli disengagement, has been based on a unique set of 
conditions to the effect that withdrawals will be partial, phased and conditional, 
while the details of final borders (and indeed all significant issues) will be deferred. 
While all this is going on, Palestinians have to adhere to a strict code of non-
aggression against Israel and Israeli settlements and settlers in the occupied territories, 
even if Israel continues to carry out security operations and targeted killings that it can 
argue are necessary for its survival. In practice, this has also meant that all 
withdrawals are reversible, because Palestinians have signally failed to show this 
degree of restraint. 
 
Withdrawals would be partial because critical areas within the oPt would be kept 
under Israeli control, including in particular international borders, most internal roads, 
corridors necessary for military purposes, and key settlements. At the most optimistic 
stage of the Oslo interim period, Israel retained control of roughly 60 per cent of the 
West Bank and 25 per cent of the densely populated Gaza Strip. Further withdrawals 
were to be phased in a deliberately slow and open-ended way. During the interim 
period, Israel made no effort even to keep to the agreed timetable, signalling that the 
already laborious schedule could take years or even decades to complete. And these 
phased withdrawals would be conditional in that the ceding of more control over 
territories already handed over would depend on security being achieved for Israel, as 
judged by Israel. If security were judged unsatisfactory, for whatever reason, all or 
some of the withdrawals could be reversed and the process would begin again. The 
uniqueness of this set of conditions compared to other examples of withdrawals from 
occupied territories or colonies should not be underestimated.  
These specific features of ‘security first’ create an open-ended period of limbo in 
which the disengaged territories are neither truly sovereign nor technically part of 
Israel. Nevertheless, authorities ‘governing’ these regions with very limited autonomy 
are to be held responsible for delivering security to the occupiers, whose direct 
occupation of significant areas continues, without enjoying sovereignty or controlling 
their internal economy. In fact, economic conditions for large parts of the occupied 
population actua lly worsened during Oslo as new, internal borders with Israel were 
set up without control over international borders being relinquished. During this 
                                                 
4 See Disengagement, the Palestinian Economy and the Settlements, World Bank, 23 June 2004. 
Available at www.worldbank.org/ps. 
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period, economic survival was based on specific ‘interim’ arrangements for economic 
transactions with Israel, whose economy now became ‘external’ to the Palestinians, 
thereby giving Israel enhanced powers of inflicting economic pain on the occupied 
population. The constrictive nature of these economic arrangements is critical for 
understanding the political and economic impasse during the Oslo period.5  
Three possib le motivations may help to explain why Israel insisted on this unique set 
of conditions for disengagement, each consistent with a different set of strategic goals 
that Israel may have been trying to achieve. The first possibility is that security first is 
necessary for ensuring Israeli security in the context of a strategic goal to withdraw 
from territories occupied in 1967. However, we will see that this claim turns out to be 
very difficult to justify on grounds of strategic logic if Israeli arguments are taken at 
face value. A second possibility is that Israel recognizes the strategic necessity of 
withdrawing its settlements from the occupied territories, but requires time to 
organize the withdrawal, and security first provides the framework for organizing the 
necessary withdrawal. However, we will see that this possibility is inconsistent with 
Israeli actions on the ground. A third, more worrying possibility is that ‘security first’ 
is part of a long-term Israeli strategy of managing ‘self-governing’ Palestinian 
territories that are not intended to have full sovereignty. While this appears to 
contradict Israel’s perceived interest in a two-state solution, it is possible to 
understand the rationality of this strategy from an Israeli perspective once we look at 
Israel’s broader ethno-demographic concerns, even though the long-term 
sustainability of the strategy remains questionable.  
 
Achieving security 
The difficulty of taking the first possibility at face value can be established by simply 
asking if the doctrine of ‘security first’ make sense as a strategy for ensuring Israeli 
security in a context where it intends to withdraw from the occupied territories. It is a 
legitimate demand for both sides that violence should cease while negotiations over 
the details of the withdrawal and its implementation are taking place. But we know 
(as ex-president Clinton has pointed out) what the outcome of the negotiations have to 
be if the Palestinian state is to be politically and economically viable. It cannot take a 
great deal of time to work out the borders of the territory from which Israel has to 
withdraw if this was the major issue. So why insist on a partial, phased, conditional, 
and reversible set of withdrawals under the security-first rubric without publicly 
committing itself to the final borders of a sovereign Palestinian state? The only 
possible security reason that could justify why Israel should insist on security first 
before it publicly commits itself to a full withdrawal could be that Israel is unsure of 
the future intentions of a hostile Palestinian state on its border. ‘Security first’ could 
perhaps represent a test of the Palestinian will to ensure Israeli security after 
independence is granted before formally agreeing to its final shape.  
                                                 
5 Jamil Hilal and Mushtaq H. Khan ‘State Formation Under the PNA’, in Mushtaq H. Khan, with 
George Giacaman and Inge A mundsen (eds.), State Formation in Palestine: Governance and Viability 
during a Social Transformation (London: RoutledgeCurzon, 2004), pp. 71-82. 
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This justification appears to be reasonable, but does not in fact make strategic sense. 
There can be no credible pre-commitment of their future intentions by the Palestinians 
because human beings can always change their minds. For Israel to be sure that future 
attacks will not take place, it needs to have conventional military forces deployed 
along an internationally recognized border. However, Israel already possesses 
overwhelming military superiority not only against any conceivable threat from a 
future Palestinian state but also against threats from more populous and militarily 
advanced Arab neighbours. Given this, it is difficult to make a security case to delay a 
full withdrawal and transfer of sovereignty.  And if a security case could be made, 
which argued that Israel does not have the military superiority to defend its pre-1967 
borders, there would never be a time from a security perspective when sovereignty 
could be handed over. This is because there is no such thing as a credible commitment 
not to attack in the future by showing a willingness to refrain from attacking today. In 
either case, by unpacking the steps in the strategic logic we can see that the doctrine 
of security first makes no sense as part of a roadmap towards the creation of a 
sovereign Palestinian state on pre-1967 borders if Israel was really committed to a full 
withdrawal and the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state. If anything, by 
increasing Palestinian frustration and allowing the expansion of critical settlements, it 
makes the eventual creation of such a state less likely. 
 
Allowing the withdrawal of settlers 
A second, more credible Israeli justification for ‘security first’ is that even if Israel is 
committed to the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state by withdrawing to pre-1967 
borders, it has to ensure the security of the settlements during an interim period when 
withdrawal was taking place. Since it may be politically difficult to make the security 
of the settlements a major public demand from the Israeli side, even as an interim 
measure, it may be easier to ensure their security by insisting on the more general 
demand of security first as a condition for proceeding with the withdrawal. The 
difference with the previous argument is that although it cannot be explicitly stated, 
the aim here is to ensure the security of settlers now, rather than the security of the 
international borders of Israel in the future. The utility of the ‘security first’ approach 
would be to allow Israel to maintain effective sovereignty over parts of the occupied 
territory during an interim period in order to ensure the security of departing settlers.  
But to be plausible, this explanation needs to be substantiated by at least some 
observations of concerted efforts by Israel to prepare for the withdrawal of 
settlements, not just from selected population centres, but also across the board. Yet 
under Oslo, just the opposite occurred. Far from withdrawing settlers from settlements 
that were far from Palestinian population centres, the number of settlers roughly 
doubled between 1994 and 2000. It is particularly interesting that the rate of increase 
of settlers was just as high if not higher under Labor governments that were ostensibly 
more committed to the Oslo process. Although some settlers in ‘unauthorized’ 
settlements that could not be easily protected were occasionally removed, there was 
no political showdown based on a planned withdrawal of settlers in general. These 
facts on the ground suggest that ‘security first’ was not a strategy to facilitate the 
withdrawal of all settlers. If it had anything to do with settlers, it was to offer critical 
settlements permanent protection, often on the most fertile land with access to water.  
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More to the point, the argument about the need to protect settlers while they prepare 
to leave does not explain why ‘security first’ conditions should continue to hold for 
the Gaza Strip after the settlers will ostensibly have left. According to Sharon’s plan, 
Israel will continue to control parts of the Gaza Strip and to control access to it by 
land, sea, and air. It will thereby continue to contain the Gaza Strip economically 
while testing the Palestinian commitment to Israeli security conditions  without any 
Israeli settlers being present in that specific territory. If these security conditions are 
not met by the Palestinians, which is the likely eventual outcome under conditions of 
economic hardship and political domination, reversals can be expected in the future. If 
‘security first’ were really intended to protect settlers, it would be discontinued in the 
Gaza Strip under the Sharon disengagement plan, and the expansion of settlements in 
the West Bank would have ceased long ago.  
The conclusion cannot be avoided that both the expansion of settlements in the West 
Bank and the proposed withdrawal of settlers from the Gaza Strip are more consistent 
with the well-established pattern of conditional, partial and reversible Israeli 
withdrawals from population centres and that they help to retain an overall ‘matrix of 
control’ over the occupied territory.  
 
A part of Israel’s long-term management strategy  
If the first justification for ‘security first’ is not strategically credible, the second is 
inconsistent with the facts on the ground. A third possible justification is consistent 
with the facts on the ground but appears to be inconsistent with Israel’s long-term 
strategic interests. This argument is that ‘security first’ is part of a long-term Israeli 
management strategy that is not intended to lead to a sovereign Palestinian state but 
only to pockets of Palestinian self-government subject to Israeli re-occupation. This 
explanation appears to be inconsistent with the widespread assumption that Israel 
seeks a resolution to its ethno-demographic crisis by supporting a two-state solution 
on pre-1967 Israeli borders. But this is only because outsiders have taken a simplistic 
view of the ethno-demographic challenge facing Israel.  
A closer look at the issues suggests that the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state 
based on the 1967 borders will not solve critical aspects of the ethno-demographic 
challenge that constitutes Israel’s ‘Palestinian problem’. Indeed, in some respects, the 
creation of such a state may make the management of some aspects of this ‘problem’ 
more difficult from an Israeli perspective. This could explain why an internal Israeli 
consensus on the two-state solution has never emerged. Even those Israeli policy-
makers who ostensibly support a two-state solution have had a very limited 
conception of what a “state” is, and ultimately colluded in the perpetuation of a 
‘management strategy’. Outsiders have looked at the demographic implications of 
Israel trying to absorb the Palestinians in the occupied territory to conclude that Israel 
must support a two-state solution, and that to be politically and economically viable, 
the Palestinian state must be based on 1967 borders. But they have not adequately 
addressed two far less soluble facets of the same problem.  
First, Israel already has a large internal Palestinian population with Israeli citizenship, 
amounting to 20 per cent of its population and growing. Wherever the final borders 
are drawn, Israel will continue to have a significant Palestinian minority. A serious 
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potential challenge to Israel’s Jewish constitution does not require a Palestinian 
majority. A significant minority that demands equal constitutional rights is just as 
damaging. Second, Israel has to deal with a refugee Palestinian population in exile 
that is at least as big as Israel’s current Jewish population. The Palestinian refugees in 
exile have rights that a Palestinian leadership in a West Bank state may not be legally 
capable of signing away, even if it were politically minded to do so. Nor are the 
refugees likely to give up their political fight regardless of the legality or the politics 
of any deal between Israel and the Palestinian leadership based in the occupied 
territories. When these two critical aspects of the broader ethno-demographic 
challenge are factored in, it becomes clear why many Israelis believe that there is no 
lasting and permanent solution to its ‘Palestinian problem’, wherever the borders with 
a Palestinian state are drawn.  
There is a growing recognition across the Israeli political spectrum that this is indeed 
the case. Statements that have explicitly supported our interpretation have come from 
Benny Morris at one end of the Israeli political spectrum to Binyamin Netanyahu at 
the other. But outside observers have either ignored these internal Israeli discussions 
or believed that they represent the concerns of insignificant minorities.6 The 
likelihood is that although many Israelis may support a Palestinian state, the type of 
state they support is a permanently ‘non-sovereign’ one. Indeed, from Israel’s 
perspective, it is possible to see why a full withdrawal to the 1967 borders and the 
creation of a sovereign and viable Palestinian state may actually make the 
management of these other problems more rather than less difficult.  
To begin with, consider the Israeli Palestinians. They now make up around 20 per 
cent of the Israeli population, and some Israelis have already identified them as the 
most serious threat to Zionism. Israeli Palestinians are beginning to argue that Israel 
will have to choose between its claim of being a democracy and maintaining the core 
characteristics of the Jewish state. This is because the Jewish nature of the state in 
Israel is not just about Judaism having a ceremonial role as the state religion (akin to 
Anglicanism in England) but about establishing a series of unequal and preferential 
legal and constitutional rights for Jews. These include the right of return (denied to 
non-Jewish refugees and their descendants), significant formal and informal rights 
that flow from the responsibility of military service (that Palestinians are not 
‘required’ to do), preferential access to land, unequal taxation, differential access to 
state services, different classes of citizenship with and without voting rights (the 
Arabs of annexed East Jerusalem have Israeli identity cards but no voting rights) and 
so on. By contrast, the constitutional recognition of democracy would entail equal 
legal rights and responsibilities for all Israeli citizens irrespective of their religious or 
racial affiliation. 7    
                                                 
6 See Benny Morris, ‘There Can Never be Peace Between Israelis and Palestinians’, Guardian, 21 
February 2002 and Nabulsi, ‘The Peace Process and the Palestinians’, p. 226. 
  
7 See, for instance, Azmi Bishara, ‘Being an Arab Citizen of the State of Israel’, Los Angeles Times, 12 
January 2003 and Allan C. Brownfeld, ‘Israel Must Face the Contradiction between a “Jewish” and a 
“Democratic” State’, Washington Report on Middle Eastern Affairs, April 2003, pp. 71–2. The latter is 
available at www.washington-report.org/archives/april03/0304071.html. See also William Cook, 
‘Israeli Democracy: Fact or Fiction?’, Counterpunch, 25 January 2003 (available on 
http://www.counterpunch.org/cook01252003.html); and Oren Yiftachel, The Shrinking Space of 
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There are a number of ways in which the internal constitutional dilemma faced by 
Israel impacts on its strategy towards the West Bank and Gaza Strip. If Zionism 
requires the maintenance of inferior legal and constitutional rights for Israeli 
Palestinians in any case, why should Israel not extend the sys tem of graduated rights 
and absorb the West Bank and Gaza entirely, or in large part? Indeed, some members 
of Likud openly advocate the complete absorption of the occupied territory into Israel 
by extending the partial citizenship system of East Jerusalem, namely Israeli identity 
cards without voting rights, to the rest of the oPt.8  
Other unspoken considerations are even more serious. Most Israeli Palestinians have 
been restrained in their criticism of the limited and unique constitutional rights that 
apply to them. Their quiescence is not surprising when Palestinians in the occupied 
territory are contained in dependent bantustans with vaguely defined borders. The fear 
of being converted into similar ‘self-governing’ areas and of their liberty being 
subjected to severe restrictions has kept Arab Jerusalemites and Israeli Palestinians 
from voicing constitutional demands with any vigour. Were a sovereign Palestinian 
state with internationally recognized borders to be created, this would remove the 
ambiguity about the status of Israeli Palestinians, and it would be natural to expect 
these citizens of Israel to assert their claim for equal rights much more strongly.  
Further, for some Israelis the maintenance of Jewish enclaves in the occupied territory 
also keeps alive the possibility of ‘resolving’ the problem of the Israeli Palestinians in 
radical ways. For instance, it may be possible to put pressure on a client Palestinian 
state that remains territorially and economically unviable to accept the ‘transfer’ of 
Israeli Palestinians out of Israel in exchange for persuading some of the remaining 
settlers in the West Bank to return to Israel. These dreams of a further round of ethnic 
cleansing are increasingly being discussed in Israel, but their limited plausibility 
would disappear entirely if a future Palestinian state has achieved full sovereignty and 
economic viability. Keeping outposts of settlers deep inside a disconnected set of 
bantustans and maintaining the Gaza Strip as an area subject to asymmetric 
containment, even if it is without any settlers, increases Israel’s political flexibility to 
explore such options 15 to 20 years from now. A fully sovereign Palestinian state, on 
the other hand, would be far less likely to assist in resolving such problems. 
As for the refugees and their descendants, there are legal questions as to whether their 
right to return, which is an individual right, can be signed away by the leader of a 
Palestinian state that would be based on territories from which most refugees did not 
originate. Quite apart from the fact that any Palestinian political leader in the West 
Bank-Gaza Strip would be committing political suicide by signing away these rights, 
it is not at all clear, as touched on above, that any Palestinian leader has the legal 
authority to sign these rights away. This means that regardless of any deal with a 
Palestinian state on the right of return, Israel would have to live with the demands of 
millions of Palestinian refugees in neighbouring countries who are unlikely to accept 
the legitimacy of any ‘signing away’ of their internationally recognized rights.  
                                                                                                                                            
Citizenship: Ethnocratic Politics in Israel, Middle East Research and Information Project, 2002. This is 
available at www.globalpolicy.org/nations/sovereign/citizen/2003/0618israel.htm. 




From an Israeli perspective, the creation of a sovereign and viable Palestinian state 
may well make the management of this problem more, not less, difficult. As long as 
there is no settlement, the status quo can continue and the hopeful Zionist may believe 
that eventually the refugees will disappear into their host communities. However, as 
soon as a Palestinian state is created, the refugee issue will come to the fore. Even 
ignoring the issue of the Israeli Palestinians, a Zionist might support a two-state 
solution only if it were also possible to force this Palestinian state to accept large 
numbers of returning refugees. The latter are at least very likely to be indignant with a 
leadership that had colluded in what they would perceive as a ‘sell-out’. Even if the 
Palestinian state had signed treaties to this effect, the ‘return’ of refugees to a place 
from which they do not originate may be very difficult to effect. International 
subsidies for absorbing refugees might not compensate a future Palestinian state for 
the potential political risk and cost of absorbing large numbers of disgruntled and 
disaffected citizens. On the other hand, if the Palestinian ‘state’ remained weak and 
dependent on Israel, and security first conditions allowed Israel to maintain a presence 
and a say inside the territories, much more effective pressure may be put on this state 
to cooperate in absorbing, managing and containing the potential hostility of millions 
of returning Palestinians. Since the repatriation of refugees would take years and 
perhaps decades to complete, the management of this aspect of the ‘Palestinian 
problem’ is at least a very long term if not permanent strategic concern for Israel.  
This brief discussion suggests why creating a viable and sovereign Palestinian state 
before other equally serious aspects of Israel’s ‘Palestinian problem’ have been 
resolved may restrict Israel’s perceived freedom of manoeuvre and even threaten the 
viability of Israel’s Jewish quasi-constitution. Israel’s goal, from this perspective, is 
therefore to manage the ‘problem’ by means of creating a series of reversible 
bantustans. The problem is that these enclaves are by definition not viable and create 
more Palestinian anger and violence. From this perspective, ‘security first’ plays a 
critical role both in signalling Israel’s long-term interest and presence in all of the 
Palestinian territories, and in justifying an ongoing response to the unrest that is likely 
to be a permanent feature of an endless ‘transitional’ phase.  
This is the real strategic significance of ‘security first’, which makes no sense as a 
means of achieving security in the conventional sense or as a step towards achieving a 
viable and sovereign Palestinian state. Even though official Israeli policy documents 
do not make these connections for obvious reasons, it would be unfair to accuse Israel 
of any hidden agenda or conspiracy. Many of the discussions and debates on which 
this analysis is based are public – in the Israeli media, political parties, think tanks, 
and universities. The relevant documents are easily available, including on the 
Internet.  
If there is a conspiracy, it is a conspiracy of silence on the part of the international 
community, which has refused to acknowledge what the Israelis have actually been 
saying. Members of the international community have preferred to rely upon what 
they think they know about Israel’s real interests. In contrast, Israeli leaders, and not 
just Sharon, have often said that the ‘Palestinian problem’ is unlikely ever to be 
solved; it just has to be ‘managed’. Israel’s strategic goal, the origins of which can be 
traced back to the very foundation of the state, has been to achieve the military and 
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political capacity to manage the problem. 9 When considered in the context of the 
demographic facts, the constitutional, not just the territorial, claims of Zionists and 
Palestinians ultimately constitute a ‘zero-sum’ game. This reading of its options 
suggests that as its long-term strategy, Israel is at best likely to agree to the creation of 
a number of dependent Palestinian homelands. The significance of ‘security first’ is 
that it is both invoked as the justification for not engaging in discussions of full 
withdrawal and the rapid creation of a sovereign Palestinian state, as well as providing 
the cover for the necessary military management of the inevitable Palestinian unrest. 
This analysis suggests that the international community’s focus on territory and 
territorial concessions has diverted attention from the real obstacles on the path to the 
two-state solution. Instead of asking, for example, why the Palestinians have been 
unwilling to concede two or three per cent more of their land, it would have been 
more pertinent to ask why Israel feels compelled to keep another two or three per cent 
or indeed a significantly higher percentage of Palestinian land; why it wishes to 
control Palestinian borders; and why it wants to maintain a presence deep inside 
ostensibly sovereign territories. Why has Israel been so keen to maintain control over 
the political, ecological, and economic viability of the Palestinian entity or entities 
that it seeks to create? Further, does the justification of all this on the grounds of 
‘security first’ actually make sense in terms of security? Might security first not make 
more sense in terms of Israel’s perception of how it can deal with the broader range of 
ethno-demographic challenges it faces, and which it openly discusses within the 
country? Had these questions been asked sooner, it would have been apparent that the 
massive gap between the facts on the ground and the diplomatic discourse was no 
accident and that it did not reflect a failure of consistent strategic behaviour on the 
part of the Israelis.  
However, although Israel’s insistence on ‘security first’ makes sense in the sense that 
it is arguably the best strategy from the perspective of Zionist goals, this does not 
mean that these goals are achievable. It is important for the international community 
to understand what they are signing up to by not questioning the feasibility of these 
underlying goals. Israel’s overwhelming military superiority and its alliance with the 
only remaining superpower may well have lulled it into believing that its management 
strategy can be a permanent one. But too many things can go wrong. One possibility 
is that power in the occupied Palestinian territory may slip out of the hands of those 
Palestinians who hope against hope for a peaceful resolution into the hands of those 
who believe (as most Zionists already appear to believe), that the Palestinian conflict 
with Israel truly is a ‘zero sum’ game. If this happens, a very rapid deterioration can 
be expected, with the possibility of Israel attempting to carry out large-scale transfers 
of population and the involvement of neighbouring countries in a major conflict. It is 
not at all clear that the international community is prepared for this. At the other 
extreme, another possibility is the emergence of a non-violent Palestinian movement 
to demand civil and political rights for all Palestinian constituencies. This too could 
present a new and perhaps even greater challenge to the permanent continuation of 
Israel’s management strategy.  
 
                                                 
9 See Avi Shlaim, The Iron Wall: Israel and the Arab World (London: Penguin, 2000) pp. 1-53. 
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The disengagement plan 
To many, the disengagement plan initiated by Sharon appears to be significantly 
different to the earlier Oslo process. It may appear to contradict the analysis presented 
so far. But in many key respects, it represents a minor modification of an established 
strategy.  
An immediate difference appears to be an Israeli commitment to withdraw settlers 
from most or all of the Gaza Strip. But in fact, conditional withdrawal from 
population centres while maintaining the containment of these areas is precisely the 
old strategy. Indeed, for Israel this was a cornerstone of the Oslo process. The 
proposed withdrawal of settlers from Gaza has been combined with the intention of 
maintaining and even strengthening Israel’s containment by enhancing border 
controls with Egypt and the Mediterranean while strengthening and extending 
settlements in the West Bank.  
In this context, the plan to withdraw settlers from Gaza can be viewed as entirely 
consistent with a strategy of controlling and containing Palestinian territories while 
withdrawing from densely populated areas. Indeed, our argument has been that 
settlers have been used to justify ‘security first’ and the containment of Palestinian 
territories rather than that containment was imposed to protect the settlers. Settlements 
assist containment only if they can be cheaply maintained; otherwise, containment  
and limited sovereignty are less easy to justify, but our argument explains why they 
will continue. Maintaining settlements is no longer inexpensive in the Gaza Strip, in 
isolated areas of the West Bank or deep inside Palestinian towns. But for most 
settlements and settlers, the Israeli intent to stay put remains unchanged for the 
foreseeable future. Indeed, settlements are being expanded in the West Bank.  
These observations raise important questions about the role of the international 
community in facilitating the disengagement plan. The international community is 
caught between a rock and a hard place. There is no question of withdrawing, or 
possibly even reducing, aid to the Palestinian territories and to the Palestinian 
National Authority in the context of one of the steepest declines in living standards 
seen in recent history. 10 At the same time, subsidizing Israel’s strategy of containment 
is not likely to lead to progress towards a viable two-state solution, as the Oslo 
experience has clearly demonstrated. It is not easy to dismiss out of hand the voices of 
those Palestinians who now argue that Oslo afforded Israel the opportunity to 
intensify and formalize containment in a way that may not have been possible during 
the pre-Oslo occupation. A similar and further intensification and formalization of 
containment may follow in Gaza, and the international community may once again 
participate in giving this process legitimacy. Far from disengagement being a step 
towards the creation of a viable Palestinian state, it may further the formalization of a 
system of control that can better be described as ‘institutionalized containment’ or 
‘bantustanization’.  
 
                                                 
10 World Bank, Disengagement, the Palestinian Economy and the Settlements, pp. 1-3. 
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Conclusion 
The dilemma facing international donors should not preclude support for Palestinians 
in the context of Israeli plans for a unilateral disengagement from Gaza. But this 
should be truthfully described as relief and welfare, not as support for a state-
formation exercise that is not remotely realistic. Nor should it preclude a more 
transparent analysis of Israeli strategies.  
In the long run, resolution of the conflict requires a frank debate within Israel and 
between it and its friends abroad about what, if anything, can be done to preserve 
Zionism given the demographic reality of modern Israel–Palestine. It is precisely 
because the creation of a sovereign Palestinian state does not provide a satisfactory 
solution to the constitutional crisis facing Zionism that Israel has refused to grab the 
apparent opportunity presented by Oslo. On the other hand, a bantustanization 
strategy posing as a two-state solution is unlikely to get the minimum Palestinian 
support required to achieve even a temporary resolution of the conflict. Palestinians 
on the ground can see the reality of what is happening. Their growing internal 
fragmentation and refusal to participate with any great enthusiasm in this ‘state-
formation exercise’ is evidence of this. But this should not be interpreted as signalling 
the absence of partners for peace on the Palestinian side. Instead, it should force the 
international community to reconsider some of its own assumptions about the  
strategic goals of the parties and the price that has to be paid if Israel’s underlying 
strategic goal is not to be questioned.  
